epistemological shift pros and consanimate dead mtg combo
epistemological shift pros and cons. The following sections consider why understanding might have such additional value. Secondly, one might wonder if Wilkenfelds account of understanding as representation manipulation is too inclusivethat it rules in, as cases of bona fide understanding, representations that are based on inaccurate but internally consistent beliefs. Sliwa, P. IVUnderstanding and Knowing. What is curiosity? Carter, J. Hills, A. . To the extent that such a move is available, one has reason to resist Morriss rationale for resisting Pritchards diagnosis of Kvanvigs case. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. Pritchard, D. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value In A. OHear (ed. For example, we might suppose an agent has a maximally complete explanation of how Michelangelos David came into existence between 1501 and 1504, what methods were used to craft it, what Michelangelos motivating reasons were at the time, how much clay was used, and so on. Examines reasons to suppose that attributions of understanding are typically attributions of knowledge, understanding-why or objectual understanding. Firstly, Kvanvig introduces propositional understanding as what is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand that X (for example, John understands that he needs to meet Harold at 2pm). In the first version, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumors that turn out to be luckily true. 115, No. Whitcomb, D. Epistemic Value In A. Cullison (ed. What is Justified Belief? In G. S. Pappas (ed. Meanwhile, he suggests that were you to ask a fake fire officer who appeared to you to be a real officer and just happened to give the correct answer, it is no longer plausible (by Pritchards lights) that you have understanding-why. He leaves grasping at the level of metaphor or uses it them literally but never develops it. Philosophy of Science, 79(1) (2012): 15-37. We can accommodate the thought that not all beliefs relevant to an agents understanding must be true while nonetheless insisting that cases in which false beliefs run rampant will not count as understanding. He argues that intuitions that rule against lucky understanding can be explained away. Endorses the idea that when we consider how things would be if something was true, we increase our access to further truths. Firstly, Wilkenfelds context-sensitive approach is in tension with a more plausible diagnosis of the example just considered: rather than to withhold attributing understanding in the case where the student is surrounded by experts, why notinsteadand in a way that is congruous with the earlier observation that understanding comes in degreesattribute understanding to the student surrounded by experts, but to a lesser degree (for example, Tim has some understanding of physics, while the professor has a much more complete understanding). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. The underlying idea in play here is that, in short, thinking about how things would be if it were true is an efficacious way to get to further truths; an insight has attracted endorsement in the philosophy of science (for example, Batterman 2009). Facebook Instagram Email. The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69. Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. 0. So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. As Kvanvig sees it, knowing requires non-accidental links between (internal) mental states and external events in just the right way. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. In this respect, then, Kvanvigs view achieves the result of a middle ground. Eds. For one thing, it is prudent to note up front that there are uses of understanding that, while important more generally in philosophy, fall outside the purview of mainstream epistemology. Pragmatism as an epistemological approach accentuates the reasoning of theories and concepts by studying their consequences and goals, values and interests they support. Pritchards (2010) account of the distinctive value of understanding is, in short, that understanding essentially involves a strong kind of finally valuable cognitive achievement, and secondly, that while knowledge comes apart from cognitive achievement in both directions, understanding does not. To what extent do the advantages and disadvantages of, for example, sensitive invariantist, contextualist, insensitive invariantist and relativist approaches to knowledge attributions find parallels in the case of understanding attributions. Wilkenfeld, D. Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (2013): 997-1016. Criticizes the claim that understanding-why should be identified with strong cognitive achievement. While his view fits well with understanding-why, it is less obvious that objectual understanding involves grasping how things came to be. Argues against compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. Divides recent views of understanding according to whether they are manipulationist or explanationst; argues for a different view according to which understanding is maximally well-connected knowledge. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Defends views that hold explanation as indispensable for account of understanding and discusses what a non-factive account of grasping would look like. A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. The proponent of moderate factivity owes an explanation. 1pt1): pp. Such cases she claims feature intervening luck that is compatible with understanding. This is a change from the past. Zagzebski, L. On Epistemology. Stanley, J. But most knowledge is not metaknowledge, and epistemology is therefore a relatively insignificant source of knowledge. In addition, the weak view leaves it open that two agents might count as understanding some subject matter equally well in spite of the fact that for every relevant belief that one has, the other agent maintains its denial. This leaves us, however, with an interesting question about the point at which there is no understanding at all, rather than merely weaker or poorer understanding. Often-cited discussion of the fake barn counterexample to traditional accounts of knowledge that focus on justified true belief. Uses the concept of understanding to underwrite a theory of explanation. Knowledge is almost universally taken to be to be factive (compare, Hazlett 2010). Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127. Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge. Synthese 191 (2014): 945-959. Is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so forth? Looks at understandings role in recent debates about epistemic value and contains key arguments against Elgins non-factive view of understanding. Put generally, according to the coherentist family of proposals of the structure of justified belief, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system, or some variation on these themes (Olsson 2012: 1). Argues against a factive conception of scientific understanding. Argues that requiring knowledge of an explanation is too strong a condition on understanding-why. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. On the one hand, we have manipulationists, who think understanding involves an ability (or abilities) to manipulate certain representations or concepts. Pritchard maintains that it is intuitive that in the case just described understanding is attainedyou have consulted a genuine fire officer and have received all the true beliefs required for understanding why your house burned down, and acquire this understanding in the right way. Carter, J. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). Make sure you cite them appropriately within your paper and list them in APA format on your Reference page. For example, by trusting someone I should not have trusted, or even worse, by reading tea leaves which happened to afford me true beliefs about chemistry. Batterman, R. W. Idealization and modelling. Synthese, 169(3) (2009): 427-446. For a less concessionary critique of Kvanvigs Comanche case, however, see Grimm (2006). Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. Given that the result is the same (that is, the patients heart muscle blood supply is improved) regardless of whether he successfully completes the operation by luck or by skill, the instrumental value of the action is the same. Grimm (2006) and Pritchard (2010) counter that many of the most desirable instances of potential understanding, such as when we understand another persons psychology or understand how the world works, are not transparent. Even so, and especially over the past decade, there has been agreement amongst most epistemologists working on epistemic value that that understanding is particularly valuable (though see Janvid 2012 for a rare dissenting voice). This section considers the connection between understanding-why and truth, and then engages with the more complex issue of whether objectual understanding is factive. For example, I can understand the quadratic formula without knowing, or caring, about who introduced it. He claims that while we would generally expect her to have knowledge of her relevant beliefs, this is not essential for her understanding and as a result it would not matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (and were therefore merely accidentally true). Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. One natural place to start will be to examine the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck. One point that could potentially invite criticism is the move from (1) and (2) to (3). Make sure you cite them appropriately within your paper, and list them in APA format on your Reference page. One can split views on this question into roughly three positions that advocate varying strengths of a factivity constraint on objectual understanding. 13. The Psychology of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2(3) (2007): 564-591. University of Edinburgh DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. This is because we might be tempted to say instead that we desire to make sense of things because it is good to do so rather than saying that it is good to make sense of things because we desire it. An in-depth exploration of different types of epistemic luck. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. For What is it to have this ability to modify some mental representation? Of course, though, just as Lackey (2007) raises creationist teacher style cases against knowledge transmission principles, one might as well raise a parallel kind of creationist teacher case against the thesis that one cannot attain understanding from a source who herself lacks it. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. Gives an overview of recent arguments for revisionist theories of epistemic value that suggest understanding is more valuable than knowledge. Contrary to premise (3), such abilities (of the sort referenced by Khalifa in premise 2 and 3) arguably need not involve discriminating between explanations, so long as one supposes that discriminating between explanations is something one has the reliable ability to do only if one could not very easily form a belief of the form when this is false. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. Explores the pros and cons with at least 2 credible sources. On the most straightforward characterization of her proposal, one fails to possess understanding why, with respect to p, if one lacks any of the abilities outlined in (i-vi), with respect to p. Note that this is compatible with one failing to possess understanding why even if one possesses knowledge that involves, as virtue epistemologists will insist, some kinds of abilities or virtues. We can acknowledge this simply by regarding Bs understanding as, even if only marginally, relatively impoverished, rather than by claiming, implausibly, that no understanding persists in such cases. A potential worry then is that the achievement one attains when one understands chemistry need not involve the subject working the subject matterin this case, chemistryscause. Kepler improved on Copernicus by contending that the Earths orbit is not circular, but elliptical. His view is that understanding requires the agent to, in counterfactual situations salient to the context, be able to modify their mental representation of the subject matter. However, if understanding-why actually is a type of knowing how then this means that intellectualist arguments to the effect that knowing how is a kind of propositional knowledge might apply, mutatis mutandis, to understanding-why as well (see Carter and Pritchard 2013). Epistemology is a way of framing knowledge, it defines how it can be produced and augmented. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. This is a change from the past. Secondly, even subject matters that traffic in empirical rather than abstract atemporal phenomena (for example, pure mathematics), are not clearly such that understanding them should involve any appreciation for their coming to be, or their being caused to exist. ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Attempts to explain away the intuitions suggesting that lucky understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck. 121-132. Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence. In his Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding. In T. Henning and D. Schweikard (eds. Relation question: What is the grasping relationship? A good example here is what Riggs (2003) calls intelligibility, a close cousin of understanding that also implies a grasp of order, pattern and connection, but does not seem to require a substantial connection to truth. Gordon, E. C. Is There Propositional Understanding? Logos & Episteme 3 (2012): 181-192. For example, Kvanvig describes it as obtaining when understanding grammatically is followed by an object/subject matter, as in understanding the presidency, or the president, or politics (2003: 191). I side with positivism; which states knowledge can be found via empirical observations (obtained through the senses). Unlike de Regt and Dieks (2005), Wilkenfeld aims to propose an inclusive manipulation-based view that allows agents to have objectual understanding even if they do not have a theory of the phenomenon in question. In particular, as Pritchard suggests, we might want to consider that agents working with the ideal gas law or other idealizations do not necessarily have false beliefs as a result, even if the content of the proposition expressed by the law is not strictly true. Armed with this distinction, Pritchard criticizes Kvanvigs assessment of the Comanche case by suggesting that just how we should regard understanding as being compatible or incompatible with epistemic luck depends on how we fill out the details of Kvanvigs case, which is potentially ambiguous between two kinds of readings. When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. Take first the object question. It also allows attributions of understanding in the presence of peripheral false beliefs, without going so far as to grant that understanding is present in cases of internally consistent delusionsas such delusions will feature at least some false central beliefs. Consider here two cases she offers to this effect: EVOLUTION: A second graders understanding of human evolution might include as a central strand the proposition that human beings descended from apes. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. Zagzebskis weak approach to a factivity constraint aligns with her broadly internalist thinking about what understanding actually does involvenamely, on her view, internal consistency and what she calls transparency. A theoretical advantage to a weak factivity constraint is that it neatly separates propositional knowledge and objectual understanding as interestingly different. If, as robust virtue epistemologists have often insisted, cognitive achievement is finally valuable (that is, as an instance of achievements more generally), and understanding necessarily lines up with cognitive achievement but knowledge only sometimes does, then the result is a revisionary story about epistemic value. For example, Pritchards case of the fake fire officerwhich recall is one in which he thinks understanding (as well as knowledge) is lackingis one in which Rower points out taht all of the true beliefs and grasped connections between those beliefs are from a bad source. Olsson, E. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification in E. Zalta (ed. Here is one potential example to illustrate this point: consider that it is not clear that people who desire to understand chemistry generally care about the cause of chemistry. On the weakest view, one can understand a subject matter even if none of ones beliefs about that subject matter are true. It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that humans did not evolve. For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? manage list views salesforce. The Problem of the External World 2. He claims further that this description of the case undermines the intuition that the writers lack of understanding entails the readers lack of understanding. Email: emma.gordon@ed.ac.uk by | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director | Jun 9, 2022 | prayers of dedication presbyterian | advance australia national director The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. Kelp, C. Understanding Phenomena. Synthese (2015). Wilkenfeld suggests that this ability consists at least partly in being able to correct minor mistakes in ones mental representation and use it to make assessments in similar cases. See answer source: Epistemology in an Hour Caleb Beers In recent years epistemology has experienced gradual changes that are critical in human life. This holds regardless of whether we are Platonists or nominalists about such entities. Much of the philosophical tradition has viewed the central epistemological problems concerning perception largely and sometimes exclusively in terms of the metaphysical responses to skepticism. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. Trout, J.D. Firstly, grasping is often used in such a way such that it is not clear whether it should be understood metaphorically or literally. To the extent that this is right, Zagzebski is endorsing a kind of KU principle (compare: KK). Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. Rohwer, Y. This is because Stella lacks beliefs on the matter, even though the students can gain understanding from her. Section 2 explores the connection between understanding and truth, with an eye to assessing in virtue of what understanding might be defended as factive. Fourthly, a relatively fertile area for further research concerns the semantics of understanding attribution. ), Justification and Knowledge. Would this impede ones understanding? This in part for three principal reasons. If Kelps thought experiment works, manipulation of representations cannot be a necessary condition of understanding after all. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Making such an epistemological shift can then open up the possibility of communication with other-than-human persons in ways that few educational researchers seem able (or willing) to acknowledge (see Harvey, 2003). But in this version of the case, suppose that, although the book is entirely authoritative, genuine and reliable, it is the only trustworthy book on the Comanche on the shelvesevery book on the shelves nearby, which she easily could have grabbed rather than the genuine authoritative book, was filled with rumors and ungrounded suppositions. While we would apply a description of better understanding to agent A even if the major difference between her and agent B was that A had additional true beliefs, we would also describe A as having better understanding than B if the key difference was that A had fewer false beliefs.